ANZ = Security #FAIL!!

In this time of large scale security hacks, you would think that banks should be taking the lead on security. They do protect our most valuable assets. They do have teams of people whose job is to continually assess the security of their systems, recommend enhancements, and test these systems. 

I thought that was the case too, until today...

My sister is overseas, and as part of her trip, I recommended she doesn't log on to any banking sites from overseas (keyboard loggers, malware infested cafe computers etc). So she gave me the details for her ANZ Travel Card so I could top it up as she needed. Last week I decided to log on to make sure all the details where correct. I still haven't had the confidence to log on! 

My first step was to go to the website printed on the details page (www.anzfx.com) and that's where my security senses started tingling. It redirects you to https://www.anztravelcard.com/ and has a pad lock (such a security blanket that padlock hey ;) but the URL didn't look like a legit ANZ domain. I would have thought a sub-domain of their corporate domain (anz.com) would be a better choice and show more legitimacy. So I clicked to see the details of the SSL certificate:

ANZ Certificate details 

Riiiiggghhhhttt! Not even issued to a legal entity. OK, confidence dropping. So I decided to check some more details, and under the Subject metadata for the certificate, here is who it is registered to:

CN = www.anztravelcard.com
OU = FIS - Prepaid
O = Fidelity National Information Services
L = Jacksonville
S = Florida
C = US

Doesn't even mention ANZ?!? To compare, here is the details of the certificate I use for my online banking (Westpac)

CN = online.westpac.com.au
OU = Internet Online Banking
O = Westpac Banking Corporation
STREET = L 20 275 KENT ST
L = SYDNEY
S = New South Wales
PostalCode = 2000
C = AU

It's immediately obvious who the certificate is issued to, and I trust them. I also compared the certificate to the one used on the main ANZ site, which does have the organisation details, and they are issued by different vendors. Even stranger?

So, doubts already cast, I looked at the logon form:

ANZ Logon screen

Now, normally to logon, I need an identifier (an ID, email address etc) and a secret security token of some sort (password, bio fingerprint etc). Here, I need 3 things. OK. Why? Looking more closely, I need to provide my card number (identifier in the credit card world) AND my CVV2 (a quasi secret given it never is printed on receipts or the old school card impression printers). WTF? A simple man in the middle attack, and I can get the 2 pieces of information I need to use this card online! NO THANKS!!

It looks to me like ANZ has outsourced this service, but it is their name on the product, and as such, it is their responsibility to ensure customer data is not compromised. This whole platform scares me from the 20 minutes I spent looking at it, so I question how secure the platform as a whole is... 

Posted at 09:22

1 Comments:

Troy Hunt said...
Nasty, OWASP talks specifically about the redirect issue and the vulnerability to MITM attacks: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet#Rule_-_Do_Not_Perform_Redirects_from_Non-TLS_Page_to_TLS_Login_Page Unfortunately though, I'm not surprised to see a bank screwing up a security fundamental: http://www.troyhunt.com/2011/01/whos-who-of-bad-password-practices.html
August 12, 2011 10:08

Post a comment

Authors

Tags